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Abstract 
 
This paper examines recent foreign policy and the changing orientation to ‘Asia’ and ‘Asian 
engagement’. It is argued that despite the general constraints faced by the policy-making elites 
of smaller powers in an era of ‘globalization’, policy matters. In this regard, recent policy 
under the Howard government provides a stark contrast to the earlier, proactive, Asia-oriented 
policies of the Hawke-Keating era. 
 
Throughout Australia’s relatively brief life as an independent nation, relations with its 
regional Asian neighbours have been of immense significance. While ‘Asia’ may not 
always have occupied the place on Australia’s foreign policy agenda its importance 
warranted, simple geographical contingency has meant it was, and is, an unavoidable 
geopolitical reality that has to be taken seriously. Whether Australian policymakers like it 
or not there has been little choice other than to come to terms with the looming mass of 
Asia to their north.  
 
The precise style and substance of Australian foreign policy has reflected a complex and 
shifting amalgam of domestic politics and wider external imperatives. One factor which 
has made a difference in both the direction and effectiveness of Australian policymaking, 
however, has been the enthusiasm and purposefulness with which such initiatives have 
been pursued by  the ruling political elites of a particular era. In this regard, what is most 
striking about Australia’s Asia-oriented policies over the last few years under the 
leadership of John Howard’s Liberal-National Party coalition government, has been an 
apparent ambivalence about the process of regional engagement and a consequent lack of 
focus and direction in foreign policy. In short, policy has often been ad hoc, opportunistic 
and aimless. 
 
In order to understand why this is the case, and why there has been such a noteworthy 
change in the way Australian policymakers have approached relations with Asia over the 
last few years, it is necessary to place contemporary policies in historical perspective. 
This task is briefly undertaken in the first part of this essay, before giving more detailed 
consideration to the political-economic and strategic dimensions of Australian policy in 
the recent past. The conclusion that emerges from this analysis may be flagged at the 
outset:  even at a time when states are routinely assumed to have lost power as a 
consequence of  ‘globalisation’, the actions of national political elites continue to make a 
difference and profoundly influence the long-term position of individual states. Whether 
this potential influence is effectively utilised depends on the ability of policymakers to 
understand the circumstances that confront them, and then develop strategies to realise 
national goals. As we shall see, that ability and capacity has waxed and waned over the 
years, profoundly influencing the success with which Australia has ‘engaged’ with the 
region. 
 
Australia-Asia Relations in Historical Context 
 
Historically, a number of recurring themes have shaped the actions of generations of 
policymakers: as a creation of imperial Britain, Australia has always been a long way 
from ‘home’ and often painfully conscious of its isolation and potential vulnerability. The 
sense of being strangers in a strange land, surrounded by peoples of whom they knew 
little other than they were different, alien, and possibly hostile, shaped much of 
Australia’s early international relations. Indeed, it is still possible to trace the continuing 
influence of such insecurities and uncertainties in contemporary policies. 
 
This sense of isolationism and vulnerability when combined with a striking lack of desire 
for autonomy, inaugurated policies that were characterised chiefly by their dependence 
on ‘great and powerful friends’ – in Australia’s case, Britain and then the United States. 
Remarkably, although nominally an independent nation since 1901, Australia did not 
even move to establish independent diplomatic relations before World War 2, preferring 
instead to rely on Britain to mediate its external affairs. It required the unambiguous 
confirmation of Britain’s decline, evidenced by its expulsion from Southeast Asia at the 
hands of  the Japanese during World War 2, to break the colonial mindset that had 
prevailed hitherto in Australia. Even then, however, the net effect of the changing geo-
political balance in the Asia-Pacific was simply to exchange one strategic dependence for 
another, as the United States replaced Britain in the minds, if not the hearts, of Australia’s 
strategic planners.  
 
And yet the changing realities of Australia’s regional position were apparent even before 
the Second World War. Not only had Japan’s growing imperial ambitions demonstrated 
that there was now a major military power in East Asia, but its rapid rise to become 
Australia’s second largest trading partner during the 1930s also revealed the extent of its 
growing economic importance to Australia. The contradictory nature of Australia’s 
relations with Asia – part economic opportunity, part strategic threat – were encapsulated 
in this increasingly important  relationship, and continue to characterise relations with the 
region to this day. What has differed is the success with which this fundamental paradox 
has been reconciled by policymakers in different eras. 
 
At its most egregious, this tension led to abominations like the ‘White Australia’ policy, 
which was a defining orientation toward the region for much of the twentieth century. 
Dedicated to preserving not only Australia’s strategic integrity, but also its distinctive 
Anglo-Celtic culture, the enduring effect of the White Australia policy has been to 
provide an excruciatingly embarrassing legacy for subsequent generations of 
policymakers keen to embrace ‘Asia’, rather than keep it at arms length. The principal 
motivating force behind this belated change of attitude toward the region on the part of 
Australia’s political elites was largely a pragmatism borne of economic expediency: the 
direction of Australia’s trade changed profoundly in the post-war period, to a point where 
its major trading partners and export growth were overwhelmingly concentrated in the 
Asian region.1 Yet, despite the possibly  self-serving nature of Australia’s positive 
reorientation toward Asia, the nature of the changes they engendered appeared deep-
seated and permanent. 
 
Historically, the content and direction of Australia’s relations with Southeast Asia in 
particular has reflected an array of domestic and international forces.2 Australia’s 
participation in the struggle against communist insurgency in Malaya, for example,  
occurred within the overarching framework of the Cold War and its concomitant strategic 
commitments. Indeed, the logic of Australia’s alliance commitments culminated in what 
Stephen Fitzgerald calls ‘the great post-war symbol of Australia’s attitude to Asia’3 – the 
failure to recognise and the attempt to contain communist China. It was not until the 
‘watershed’ change of policy that began with the Whitlam government’s recognition of 
China in 1972  that a more independent stance toward the region emerged. This shift 
toward a more enthusiastic and independent embrace of the region continued under the 
Fraser government and culminated in the broader ‘engagement’ initiatives of the Hawke-
Keating governments of the 1980s and early ’90s This period saw the establishment of 
enduring regional institutions in which Australia has played a prominent role. Although 
the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation  (APEC) forum and the Asean Regional Forum 
(ARF) may not have fulfilled some of the more optimistic expectations of their promoters 
they might have been expected to cement Australia’s place in the region’s emerging 
institutional architecture. That Australia’s status is still in doubt is testimony to the 
difficulty of unambiguously defining its place and role in the region. 
 
Part of this uncertainty has domestic roots. The current Howard government has 
displayed rather more ambivalence than its Labor predecessors about the direction and 
content of the Asian engagement process. The sense of uncertainty that has characterised 
the Howard government’s approach to relations with North and Southeast Asia – by far 
the most important elements of ‘Asia’ as far as Australia is concerned – has permeated all 
aspects of external policy. To gain a more detailed sense of how this relative lack of 
direction and commitment has manifested itself, it is useful to divide the discussion into 
broadly political-economic and strategic spheres. 
 
The Political-Economy of Australia’s Asian Engagement 
 
To understand why the Howard government has been more cautious about the Asian 
engagement process, and why it has been given far less prominence in Australia’s policy 
agenda than it has been by some of the present government’s, we need to remember the 
circumstances in which the Liberal-National Party coalition came to power. One of the 
recurring themes of Howard’s successful election campaign was that the government of 
former Labor Minister Paul Keating was arrogant, ‘obsessed’ with Asia, and out of touch 
with the interests and concerns of ‘ordinary’ Australians. One of the major lessons that 
Howard appears to have drawn from his subsequent electoral success is that the old saw 
about there being no votes in foreign policy holds true, and that there is little to be gained 
by prioritising Asian relations as far as domestic political success is concerned. On the 
contrary, the remarkable rise of Pauline Hanson’s nationalistic, insular, and anti-Asian 
One Nation Party, seemed to confirm the political wisdom of concentrating relentlessly 
on domestic issues, and explained Howard’s subsequent reluctance to unambiguously 
distance himself from her party’s policies and attitudes.  
 
But the diminished enthusiasm evinced by the coalition government in general and by 
Howard in particular has deeper roots than simply a rather cold-blooded assessment of 
the electoral mood. Not only was Howard’s own record compromised by politically ill-
judged remarks in the late 1980s about the need to control Asian immigration, but his 
self-confessed admiration of Anglo-Celtic cultural traditions has led him to steadfastly 
obstruct a number of initiatives designed to revitalize Australian political institutions and 
achieve social reconciliation domestically. Whether it was his skilful derailing of the 
popularly supported push to make Australia a republic, or his refusal to offer a 
government endorsed apology to Australia’s aboriginal population, the Howard 
government has proved itself to be a highly conservative domestic force. It is less 
surprising, therefore, that such attitudes should influence external policies, too. 
 
The Howard government inherited a distinctive and highly ambitious approach to 
regional engagement. Policy under former Prime Minister Paul Keating had been based 
on nothing less than an attempt to win East Asia over to its own increasingly neoliberal 
policy paradigm, particularly in the area of trade liberalisation. That APEC - Labor’s 
preferred mechanism for achieving such a goal - has not fulfilled expectations, has not 
stopped the Howard government from broadly following Labor’s lead. What has been 
distinctive and innovative about the coalition has been its advocacy of strengthening 
bilateral ties at the same time.4 The Howard government, in other words, has tried to 
utilise multilateral institutions like APEC to give some impetus to the broader, long-term  
process of regional trade liberalisation, while simultaneously pursuing increasingly 
bilateral  agreements with specific partners.  
 
This move to embrace bilateral agreements is not entirely new, nor exclusive to Australia. 
Indeed, of late there has been a rash of such initiatives in the region, partly driven by the 
failure of the World Trade Organisation to initiate a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in Seattle. One of the most important developments in  Australian foreign 
policy that has flowed from this changing international situation, and one of its most 
conspicuous failures in 2000, was its frustrated attempt to link Australia’s own bilateral 
free trade area – the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship (CER) – with 
that of Southeast Asia. The rejection of the proposed union between the CER and the 
Asean Free Trade Area  (AFTA) was a decisive blow for Australia’s economic 
diplomacy and highlighted a number of important and continuing difficulties in 
Australia’s relations with the region.  
 
One of the most enduring obstacles to improving Australia’s economic and political 
relations in the East Asian region actually pre-dates the current government.  Australia’s 
relations with Malaysia have been difficult since its Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Dr 
Mahathir Mohamad came to office. Malaysian sensitivities about supposed criticisms of 
its domestic policies generally and of Dr Mahathir in particular have been at the heart of 
continuing tensions between the two countries. Whatever the merits of these arguments, 
the net effect of Malaysian antipathy as far as Australia is concerned has been to lock it 
out of a number of potentially crucial regional institutions of which it desperately wanted 
to be a part. Australia’s exclusion from the Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM), for example, 
is a continuing reminder of the constraints of Australian foreign policy in the region. The 
recent failure to link the CER and AFTA compounded the sense of policy failure toward 
the region. Significantly, despite a  highly favourable report from the task force charged 
with assessing the viability of closer CER-AFTA links, Malaysia was effectively able to 
sabotage Australia’s efforts and demonstrate Australia’s continuing vulnerability to 
Asean vetoes more generally.5 
 
It might be supposed that given the apparently imminent retirement of Dr Mahathir, that 
one of the most significant obstacles to Australia’s closer economic, and by implication 
political integration with Southeast Asia will be overcome. But it is important to 
remember that this sort of more intimate interaction is a two way street; engendering a 
more positive attitude toward Australia in the region will depend as much on Australia 
itself, as it does on any change of sentiment in the region more broadly. Indeed, 
generating good will toward Australia would seem dependent on the Australian 
government projecting the right sort of ‘image’ in East Asia generally. In this regard, 
there have been a number of mixed messages both in the political-economic and – as we 
shall see - in the security spheres which have made such an improvement in relations 
more problematic. 
 
The end of engagement? 
 
Deciding on Australia’s status in relation to East Asia is a recurring theme amongst 
policymakers and opinion leaders in Australia.6 One of the most revealing and 
unfortunate signals about the way the current government sees its relations with the 
region was provided by the Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in a statement which one 
influential Australian commentator described as ‘the most depressing, negative and 
counterproductive formulation on regionalism by any senior minister in decades’.7 
Downer argued that there are two forms of possible forms of regionalism, one ‘practical’ 
and one ‘cultural’.8 He further claimed that Australia could only practice a form of 
practical regionalism as enduring cultural differences between Australia and ‘Asia’ meant 
that Australia was inevitably prevented from developing closer ties. Apart from 
demonstrating little appreciation of the disparate and often conflicting identities and 
positions subsumed under the rhetoric of East Asian regionalism, Downer’s remarks 
effectively excluded Australia from participation in a process in which a putative sense of 
East Asian identity was and is being actively created. The possible expansion of Asean to 
include other nations like Japan, China and South Korea – countries which seemed to 
have no ‘natural’ claims to close ties with Southeast Asia - is a potentially highly 
significant development that a more Asia-oriented Australian government might have 
been expected to have tried to become a part of, or at least influence. Yet the lack of a 
sophisticated strategy for, or understanding of Asia - which Downer’s remarks so clearly 
revealed - means that Australia has been sidelined from what may prove a crucial long 
term regional development.  
 
It might be argued that the pursuit of ‘practical’ regionalism is entirely appropriate and 
something other nations practice, too. The growth of bilateral agreements throughout the 
region seems to confirm such a possibility. Singapore, has been at the forefront of this 
trend, in which it is establishing a series of relations outside Asean, and even the region 
more generally, to hasten the process of trade liberalisation. While this may also cause 
Singapore some difficulties with some of its more recalcitrant neighbours, Singapore has 
the advantage of being unambiguously ‘of’ the region in a way that Australia is not. In 
other words, Singapore is embedded in a web of institutionalised relations that give a 
degree of continuity and resilience to its intra-regional relations that Australia simply 
does not have. When Australia pursues similar strategies it can look rather like making 
the best of a bad job, especially where the government appears to lack a long term vision 
about the role it wants to play in the region. The relative ineffectiveness of Australia’s 
own multilateral initiatives like APEC, which has been increasingly side-lined by the 
World Trade Organisation, and its absence from other regional fora, mean Australian 
policymakers must secure agreements where they can. The potential problems of this 
piecemeal and ad hoc approach are compounded by the fact that one of the principal 
bilateral relations that Australia has systematically attempted to consolidate under the 
Howard government has been with the United States. 
 
The consolidation of closer economic – and, as we shall see, strategic – ties with the US 
leaves Australia vulnerable to the criticism that it is not and never can be a ‘genuine’ and 
committed member of the region, particularly the more narrowly defined East Asian 
variety. Whether it is an East Asian Economic Caucus or – what is effectively the same 
thing - the proposed Asean + 3 concept, those hostile to Australia in the region can claim 
that it remains more closely aligned to its traditional, culturally and politically 
sympathetic allies, than it does to its more geographically immediate neighbours.  This is 
especially true when one of the possible attractions of creating a stronger East Asian 
organisation is precisely to make the region less vulnerable external forces and to the 
sorts of interventionism the US practised during the recent East Asian crisis.9 That the 
economic gains form a closer relationship with the US are likely to be marginal and 
acrimoniously - if at all - realised,10 is but one reason to suppose a strategy of trying to 
align more closely with the US is likely to fail. More importantly in the long run, the 
symbolism of Australia moving to identify  more closely with an external power will do 
nothing to facilitate closer relations with the region, especially when part of this strategy 
involves strengthening the strategic dimension of that relationship. 
 
The Strategic Dimension of Australia’s Asia Relations 
 
If economic engagement with Asia has been the great potential opportunity that forced a 
major reorientation of Australian policy over the last couple of decades, the possible 
strategic threat posed by the region has been its dark flip-side. From Australia’s 
inception, the threat posed by ‘Asia’ has often been poorly understood. In the post World 
War 2 period, as Australia has gradually taken more responsibility for its own foreign 
policies, as it has developed national expertise in defence and international relations, and 
as it has developed a consequently greater capacity for independent judgement, a more 
sophisticated view of the region and Australia’s place in it has emerged. Despite this 
greater understanding on the part of Australia’s policy-making elites, however, a number 
enduring tensions continue to characterise security policy in particular. 
 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, successive Labor governments made a determined 
effort to deepen and institutionalise Australia’s relations with the region. The strategic 
counterpart to the economically-oriented APEC initiative culminated in the establishment 
of the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 – a development Australia’s activist 
regional diplomacy played a large part in realising. The rapid economic development of 
both North and latterly Southeast Asia meant that not only was the region increasingly 
important to Australia economically, but its very economic success also transformed the 
strategic outlook. In the minds of Australia’s strategic planners, this evoked a new set of 
possible threats as Southeast Asia suddenly acquired the ability to finance military 
modernisation. The ARF offered the prospect of reducing uncertainty, increasing 
transparency, and generally developing confidence building measures in an historically 
volatile region.  
 
A more contentious initiative undertaken by the former Labor government was its own 
attempt to consolidate Australia’s security position through key bilateral relationships. In 
this case the most significant bilateral security relationship was the security treaty 
negotiated with Indonesia in 1995. In retrospect it is easy to see how this strategy was 
fraught with potential difficulties. Not only was the inauguration of this agreement under 
the Keating government conducted in a highly secret and non-transparent manner, but the 
wisdom of linking Australia’s long-term future security to a close relationship with the 
aging and authoritarian figure of former President Suharto was always questionable. Just 
how unsustainable this strategy was became clear with the rapid decline in Australia-
Indonesia relations in the wake of the Timor crisis. 
 
The management of the East Timor crisis and its aftermath has in many ways been the 
defining  foreign policy and security challenge for the present Howard government. The 
history of the crisis and Australia’s military intervention has been detailed elsewhere and 
will not be repeated here.11 However, it is important to say something about the dynamics 
that underpinned it and the longer-term influence it has had on strategic thinking in 
Australia more generally. 
 
Timor and its aftermath 
 
The first point to make about Australia’s role in the East Timor crisis is that the 
intervention enjoyed widespread domestic support in Australia itself. Powerful emotional 
and historical ties dating back to World War 2, and the continuing high profile 
maintained by the Timorese diaspora in Australia and elsewhere, combined to give 
Timor-related issues a surprising prominence within a public not noted for a deep interest 
in foreign affairs. Any government would have been tempted to extract the maximum 
political capital possible from such a fortuitous outcome. Not only did the Howard 
government take full advantage of such an opportunity with a series of triumphalist 
receptions for Australian troops involved in peace-keeping operations, but they used the 
good will generated toward the Australian armed forces more generally to inaugurate a 
more wide ranging review of defence policy. 
 
Given Australia’s natural strategic advantages and its apparent invulnerability to 
conventional attack, let alone invasion, national security has always occupied a 
surprisingly prominent place in the nation’s policy priorities. The level of spending in 
Australia declined somewhat in the post-Cold War period, but historically there has been 
general bilateral support for substantial defence expenditure.  Under the Howard 
government, older patterns of defence spending are being resurrected. Significantly,  
defence has been the only area of public spending insulated form swingeing budget cuts. 
The longer term agenda of the Howard government has been to actually boost defence 
spending. In this context, sceptics have argued,12 the highly professional and successful 
Timor intervention offered away of securing public support for what at other times might 
have proved unpopular spending initiatives.  
 
Australian governments have been understandably coy about identifying precisely where 
any potential threat might come from. However, Australia’s ‘most important long-term 
strategic objective’ - the defence of its ‘direct maritime approaches’-  inevitably centres 
primarily on threats that emanate from, or through, Southeast Asia.13 This has been the 
guiding rationale for Australian defence for a number of years. What distinguishes the 
approach of the Howard government is the renewed importance and high profile attached 
to the strategic alliance with the US. Although the recent defence review is careful to 
stress the importance of  promoting stability in, and co-operation with, Southeast Asia, it 
is revealing that it is the alliance with the US that continues to receive the highest 
priority. Indeed, the report emphasises that the alliance enjoys ‘renewed vigour’, 
something it attributes to ‘the enduring shared values, interests and outlook’ that the two 
countries are perceived to enjoy.14 
 
In order to consolidate the alliance with the US, John Howard has suggested that 
Australia should, especially in the wake of the Timor crisis, play a much more active and 
high profile role in maintaining a regional security order centred on continuing American 
strategic hegemony. This has a number of implications. Most immediately, and in a 
manner reminiscent of the ‘forward defence’ policy that led to Australia’s involvement in 
wars in Korea and Vietnam, this means that Australia should be prepared to take a 
‘proactive role’ and ‘attack hostile forces as far from our shores as possible’.15 In an even 
more explicit and controversial exposition of the new policy orientation, Howard 
suggested that Australia ought to be prepared to act as America’s ‘deputy sheriff’ in 
maintaining regional stability, and acting on behalf of the US where required.16 Although, 
Howard subsequently sought to clarify these remarks following sustained domestic 
criticism, the overall direction of government policy – which the decision to increase 
defence spending highlights  - is one that continues to place greater emphasis on links 
with the US and less on those with Asia. The proposed increases in the defence budget at 
least become more comprehensible in this context;  the US has actively encouraged 
Australia to boost spending, thus allowing it to play a role as the US’s key regional 
military ally.  
 
Other  consequences of this change of orientation away from Asia and toward the US are 
more immediately obvious, especially in the deterioration of Australia’s relationship with 
Indonesia. Australia’s role in East Timor may have been well received at home and 
provided a template for its envisaged role as the US’s key regional subordinate, but it 
damaged Australia’s formerly close relations with Indonesia. Although critics have 
drawn attention to the possibly self-serving nature of Australia’s close ties with the 
former Suharto government17 - a situation which allowed both countries to exploit the oil 
and gas reserves beneath the Timor Sea - nevertheless, the rapid deterioration of the 
bilateral relationship is a major blow for Australia’s immediate security position and has 
potentially negative implications for its wider relationship with the region. Not only will 
continuing instability in Indonesia pose a major security threat for Australia, but the 
rather insensitive way Australia has handled the fall-out from the Timor crisis has clearly 
upset many Indonesians and provided ammunition for Australia’s regional critics. 
Ironically, the new coolness in relations between Canberra and Jakarta means that one of 
Australia’s principal attractions as a regional ally as far as the US is concerned – its 
knowledge of, and links with Indonesia – has now been significantly diminished. While 
Australia has been at pains to distance itself from independence movements in Aceh and 
West Papua,  President Wahid’s continuing refusal to visit Australia demonstrates just 
how far the relationship has deteriorated and how difficult it may prove to revive.  
 
Difficult as the relationship with Indonesia may be, it is important to recognise that not 
all Australia’s neighbours have been unhappy with its actions. The pivotal strategic role 
that the United States continues to play as the lynchpin of a stable regional security 
position is recognised and welcomed by many in Southeast Asia in particular. In this 
context, Australia’s supportive role in this overarching strategic environment is often 
quietly welcomed. However, the new Bush administration’s determination to press ahead 
with a missile defence system threatens to overturn the existing relative stability, raise the 
prospect of a regional arms race,18 and lock Australia into a more controversial alliance 
framework.  
 
Implications and Prospects 
 
Perceptions of Asia have changed in Australia. Its relative significance has diminished in 
the minds of a number of key policymakers over the last few years as enthusiasm for, and 
doubts about the benefits of,  the engagement project have emerged. In the wake of the 
recent East Asian economic crisis, there is a widely held perception that Southeast Asia is 
simply not as important - either economically or strategically – as it once was. The idea 
that East Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular might have been on an 
inexorable, even ‘miraculous’ upward spiral has been punctured, with inevitable 
consequences for both the way the region itself is perceived, and the way other countries 
are viewed in relation to it. Significantly, one of the conclusions that the Howard 
government drew from the recent economic crisis was that Australia’s relative immunity 
was a vindication of successive Australian governments’ approach to economic 
management. Consequently – and with an all too familiar lack of sensitivity about the 
way this might be read in the economically devastated countries of the region – Howard 
declared that Australia was now the ‘strong man of Asia’.  
 
While such remarks may have been primarily intended for domestic consumption, the 
very fact that they were offered at all betrays a revealing lack of awareness of, or 
sensitivity about the increasingly  integrated nature of the international and domestic 
spheres. Given the Howard government’s primary concern with domestic issues, and the 
Prime Minister’s own relative lack of interest in foreign affairs, such outcomes are not 
entirely surprising. Where John Howard has taken an active interest in Australia’s 
external position, it has been to place renewed emphasis on Australia’s ‘traditional’ allies. 
The desire to maintain a close political relationship with Britain by maintaining an 
institutional link with the monarchy, and the emphasis given to reviving the US strategic 
alliance, are  both in accord with Howard’s contention that Australia does not need to 
choose between its history and its geography. In other words, as far as the present 
coalition government under John Howard’s leadership is concerned, simply being 
geographically adjacent to Asia does not mean that Australia needs to either become part 
of it in some way, or repudiate relationships of longer standing.  
 
At a time when the East Asian region is in the throes of profound and potentially far-
reaching change, such an anachronistic and complacent attitude looks short-sighted. 
Australian political elites cannot assume that Asia will simply reproduce the ‘Western’ 
historical experience and inevitably or rapidly develop similar political and economic 
practices to those favoured by Australia or the US. Expecting that the burden of 
adjustment will fall exclusively on East Asia as the region comes to terms with a new 
international economic and political order is wishful thinking. The risk for Australia is 
that by not playing an active part in any emergent trans-regional institutional architecture, 
Australia inevitably becomes less able to influence the course of regional development. 
For all the claims about not having to choose between geography and history, Australia’s 
future will clearly be profoundly influenced by the region to which it is geographically 
adjacent. By not having a clearly defined strategy for encouraging closer relationships 
with its neighbours, one which allows it to play a more effective and influential role in 
regional affairs, Australia may be increasingly marginalised from a region upon which its 
long-term military and economic security depends.  
 
                                                 
1 For more detail on Australia’s changing trade position, see Beeson, M. (2000) ‘Globalization and 
international trade: international economic policies and “the national interest”’, in Boreham, P., Stokes, G. 
and Hall, R. (eds.), The Politics of Australian Society: Political Issues for the New Century, Addison 
Wesley Longman, 2000, pp 213-31. 
2 See Gurry, Meg (1995) ‘Identifying Australia’s region: From Evatt to Evans’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 49:1, 17-32. 
3 Fitzgerald, Stephen (1997) Is Australia an Asian Country?, (St Leonard’s: Allen & Unwin). 
4 This strategy was first outlined in Commonwealth of Australia (1997)  In the National Interest: 
Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy, Commonwealth of Australia, (Canberra: AGPS). 
5 Alford, P. (2000) ‘Asean blurs Australia’s free-trade vision’, The Weekend Australian, October 7-8: 6. 
6 For one of the more thoughtful and important contributions, see Fitzgereald, S. (1997) Is Australia an 
Asian Country? (St Leonard’s Allen & Unwin). 
7 Sheridan, G. (2000) ‘Inept Downer a regional flop’, The Australian, April, 28: 11. 
8 Downer, A. (2000) ‘China: Asia Leaders’ Forum – Mr. Downer’s Opening Speech’. Available at: 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/000423_alf.html 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 See Higgott, R. (2000) ‘The international relations of the Asian economic crisis’, in Robison, R. et (eds.), 
Politics and Markets in the Wake of the Asian Crisis, (London: Routledge): 261-82. 
10 See Garnaut, R. (2000) ‘US free trade agreement would rock our regional role’, The Australian, 
December 22: 9. 
11 Sebastian, L.C. and Smith, A.L. (2000) ‘The East Timor crisis: A test case for humanitarian 
intervention’, in Singh, D. (ed.), Southeast Asian Affairs 2000, (Singapore: ISEAS): 64-83. 
12 See, Beeson, M. (2000) ‘Debating  defense: Time for a paradigm shift?’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 54 (3): 255 - 259. 
13 Commonwealth of Australia (2000) Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, (Canberra: Defence 
Publishing Service): 30. 
14 Defence 2000: 34. 
15 Defence 2000: 47-48. 
16 See, Benchley, F. (1999) ‘The Howard defense doctrine’, The Bulletin,  September 28: 22-24. 
17 Burchill, S. (2000) ‘East Timor, Australia, and Indonesia’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 32 
(1&2): 59-65. 
18 Richardson, M. (2001) ‘Asia-Pacific fears arms race from Bush policies toward China’, International 
Herald Tribune, on-line version, January 25. 
